Effective compliance is a key element to the successful management of marine protected areas (MPAs), and requires a suite of tools to generate awareness of MPA rules, and monitor and regulate their use. Using vessel monitoring systems and creating geo-fences around MPA boundaries is an innovative approach to improve such awareness to vessel masters and commercial fishing licence holders with these systems on-board. In 2014, Parks Australia in partnership with the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) introduced a purpose-built alert service for commercial fishing licence holders operating in Australian Commonwealth fisheries managed by AFMA that overlap with MPAs (Australian marine parks). The alert service is customised for each individual fishing vessel to notify masters and licence holders when they enter Australian marine parks where their particular fishing method is prohibited. Since the introduction of the alert service in 25 marine parks, fishers have received 3307 alerts, across eight fisheries. It is estimated that 23 of these alerts averted compliance incidents, in turn protecting marine park values and saving AUD$4.7 million in litigation costs. Of significance, there has been no recorded incidence of noncompliance by Australian commercial fishing licence holders and their vessel master's with access to the alert service since its introduction. The information presented here is the first empirical analysis of the effectiveness of geo-fencing to minimise noncompliance in MPAs. The alert service has the potential to become a front-line tool for supporting compliance by commercial fishing licence holders and their master's in Australian marine parks and other large-scale MPAs and MPA networks, globally.
Fisheries Crime and IUU Fishing
This article traces the emergence of the ‘fisheries crime’ concept from its national Nordic roots through its introduction to, and subsequent acceptance within, the international political arena. The centrality of the associated law enforcement approach is underscored and key international processes aimed at addressing transnational organised crime in the international fishing sector are discussed. The importance of cooperation both domestically, amongst relevant government agencies, and across borders, at a region and global level, in this regard is highlighted
Marine fisheries plays an important role in ensuring food security and providing livelihoods in South Africa, as in many other developing coastal States. Transnational fisheries crime seriously undermines these goals. Drawing on empirical research this contribution highlights the complexity of law enforcement at the interface between low-level poaching and organised crime in the small-scale fisheries sector with reference to a South African case study. Specifically, this article examines the relationship between a fisheries-crime law enforcement approach and the envisaged management approach of the South African Small-Scale Fisheries Policy.
This article examines the various requirements for the exercise by a State of its enforcement jurisdiction to investigate instances of fisheries crime and its adjudicative jurisdiction to try fisheries crime cases. In the process, the jurisdictional bases available are identified, the extent of the powers available are determined and concrete examples provided. It concludes that the international law rules governing State jurisdiction over fisheries crime at sea do not place any insurmountable obstacle to the criminalisation, investigation and adjudication of acts of transnational organised fisheries crime. What is needed is a more positive attitude towards the complexities of State ocean jurisdiction and the existing scope of the States’ duties towards the marine environment, and the marine living resources more specifically.
Acoustic tagging is typically used to gather data on the spatial ecology of diverse marine taxa, informing questions about spatio-temporal attributes such as residency and home range, but detection data may also reveal unanticipated insights. Many species demonstrate predictable site fidelity, and so a sudden cessation of detections for multiple individuals may be evidence of an atypical event. During 2013 and 2014, we acoustically tagged 47 grey reef sharks (Carcharhinus amblyrhynchos) and 48 silvertip sharks (Carcharhinus albimarginatus) near reefs in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) Marine Protected Area (MPA). From March 2013 to November 2014 inclusive, tags were ‘lost’, i.e. permanently ceased to be detected within the monitoring area, at an average rate of 2.6 ± 1.0 tags per month. Between 1 and 10 December 2014, detection data suggest the near-simultaneous loss of 15 of the remaining 43 active tagged sharks, a monthly loss rate over five times higher than during the previous 21 months. Between 4 and 14 December of 2014, the BIOT patrol vessel encountered 17 vessels engaged in suspected illegal fishing in the northern BIOT MPA; such sightings averaged one per month during the previous 8 months. Two of these vessels were arrested with a total of 359 sharks on board, of which grey reef and silvertip sharks constituted 47% by number. The unusual and coincident peaks in tag loss and vessel sightings, and the catch composition of the arrested vessels, suggest illegal fishing as a plausible explanation for the unusual pattern in our detection data. A Cox proportional hazards model found that the presence of fishing vessels increased the risk of tag loss by a factor of 6.0 (95% CI 2.6–14.0, p < 0.001). Based on the number of vessels sighted and the average number of sharks on vessels arrested in BIOT during 2014, we conservatively estimate that over 2000 sharks may have been removed during the suspected fishing event. Based on average catch compositions, over 1000 would have been grey reef and silvertip sharks. Assuming a closed population mark-recapture model, over one-third of the locally resident reef sharks may have been removed from the monitoring area. The data suggest that even sporadic fishing events may have a marked impact on local reef shark populations, but also demonstrate the potential of electronic tagging a tool for detecting illegal or otherwise unreported fishing activity.
One role of Marine Protected Areas is to protect biodiversity; however, illegal fishing activity can reduce the effectiveness of protection. Quantifying illegal fishing effort within no-take MPAs is difficult and the impacts of illegal fishing on biodiversity are poorly understood. To provide an assessment of illegal fishing activity, a surveillance camera was deployed at the Seal Rocks no-take area within the Port Stephens-Great Lakes Marine Park from April 2017-March 2018. To assess impacts of illegal fishing activity in the no-take area, Baited Remote Underwater Video Systems (BRUVs) were used to quantify abundance and size of snapper Chrysophrys auratusfrom 2011–2017. BRUVs were also deployed at two nearby fished locations and two other no-take areas to allow comparison. Over 12 months of camera surveillance, a total of 108 recreational vessels were observed illegally fishing within the no-take area (avg 9.0 ± 0.9 per month). The greatest number of vessels detected in a single month was 14 and the longest a vessel was observed fishing was ~ 6 hours. From 2011–2017, the abundance of C. auratuswithin the Seal Rocks no-take area significantly declined by 55%, whilst the abundance within the other fished areas and no-take areas did not significantly decline over the same period. Lengths of C. auratus in the Seal Rocks no-take area were significantly smaller in 2017 compared to 2013 which was driven by a decline in the number of legal sized fish over 30 cm. Based on mean number of illegal fishers per vessel recorded in the no-take area, and an allowable bag limit of 10 C. auratus per person, it is possible that more than 2,000 C. auratusare removed annually from this no-take area. There is a strong likelihood that illegal recreational fishing is causing a reduction on a fishery targeted species within a no-take MPA and measures need to be implemented to reduce the ongoing illegal fishing pressure.
Multiple anthropogenic threats including excessive and illegal exploitations threaten marine biodiversity and sustainability across the globe. Sturgeons of the Caspian Sea are exposed to the extinction risk mainly due to the severe impacts by illegal fishing activities for caviar. Here we aimed to identify geospatial determinants contributing to illegal sturgeon fishing throughout the southern Caspian Sea, and to evaluate the role of geography, demography and awareness on fisher attitudes toward sturgeon conservation through the analysis of field- and questionnaire-based survey data from 501 fishers. Generalized additive model showed the associations between the occurrence of illegal fishing and geospatial variables indicating that illegal fishing was more concentrated on deeper and more distant fishing grounds. The map of areas under fishing pressure illustrated that fishers target a broad fishing grounds with spatial variability in targeted boundaries across the sea due to the geographic and ecological variations such as the slope of the continental shelf. By using structural equation modelling/path analysis, it was found that demographic (middle-age adults with higher literacy) and geographic variables (residence location and fishing zone) as well as awareness were positively associated with fisher attitudes toward sturgeon protection whilst conservation attitudes were less positive among illegal fishing communities. These findings improve our understanding of illegal sturgeon fishing, and given the role of fishers' behavior, awareness and attitude in the occurrence of illegal fishing, involving local communities in the decision making and enforcement processes can assist policy makers and managers in preventing this serious problem.
Illegal fishing is a serious problem that threatens the sustainability of fisheries around the world. Policy makers and fishery managers often rely on the imposition of strict sanctions and relatively intensive monitoring and enforcement programs to increase the costs of illegal behavior and thus deter it. However, while this can be successful in fisheries with sufficient resources to support high levels of surveillance and effective systems for imposing penalties, many fisheries lack the resources and requisite governance to successfully deter illegal fishing. Other types of governance systems, such as customary marine tenure and co-management, rely more on mechanisms such as norms, trust, and the perceived legitimacy of regulations for compliance. More generally, the absence of such social and psychological factors that encourage compliance in any fishery can undermine the efficacy of an otherwise effective and well-designed fishery management system. Here we describe insights from behavioral science that may be helpful in augmenting and securing the effectiveness of conventional deterrence strategies as well as in developing alternative means of deterring illegal fishing in fisheries in which high levels of surveillance and enforcement are not feasible. We draw on the behavioral science literature to describe a process for designing interventions for changing specific illegal fishing behaviors. The process begins with stakeholder characterization to capture existing norms, beliefs, and modes of thinking about illegal fishing as well as descriptions of specific illegal fishing behaviors. Potential interventions that may disrupt the beliefs, norms, and thought modes that give rise to these behaviors, along with those that encourage desirable behaviors, can be developed by applying principles gleaned from the behavioral science literature. These potential interventions can then be tested in artefactual experiments, piloted with small groups of actual stakeholders and, finally, implemented at scale.
This paper extends criminological interpretations of risky facilities to focus on how illegal fishing is concentrated in a small number of places in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park in Australia. Testing the applicability of the general hypothesis of risky facilities – that crime is highly concentrated among certain people, places and things – the results demonstrate that the spatial distribution of poaching in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park reflects previous environmental criminology studies which show that crime is concentrated in a small number of places. Poaching risk increases in no-take zones which share a number of homogenous characteristics that also attract legitimate routine activity. Our findings lend support to the emerging environmental criminology literature which examines wildlife crime through the lens of opportunity. Such an approach provides conservation practitioners with an established framework for developing prevention-based compliance management strategies in marine protected areas.
Links between corruption and illegal practices within fisheries are recognised in existing literature but little reference has been made to how these interconnected practices affect the performance and legitimacy of fisheries comanagement. Research in the three countries bordering Lake Victoria, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, found that corruption is systemic and that members of all stakeholder groups – fishers, fisheries officers, police and the judiciary – are implicated. It was confirmed that corruption is strongly linked to illegalities and that corruption in this context should be viewed as a collective action problem, with fishers reluctant to invest in legal gears and methods when they perceive illegalities and corruption to be prevalent. It was also found that corrupt practices linked to illegalities discourages local level fisheries management structures – the Beach Management Units – from enforcing regulations and contributes to a lack of trust between fishers and government. Linked corruption and illegal fisheries practices were therefore found to be undermining the performance and legitimacy of co-management. This article concludes that whilst co-management offers opportunities for collusive corruption through collaborative arrangements, any management system will be susceptible to the harmful effects of corruption where it is systemic and is not formally recognised or appropriately addressed. Greater official recognition of the links between corruption and illegalities, and a range of appropriate actions taken to this collective action problem, is essential if co-management is to have a chance of success.